After the War: Potential Reintegration Options for the Maoists

Prakash Bhattarai
Nepal - 26/09/2004
  Introduction

Throughout the summer of 2003, the peace process in Nepal was tenuous at best. Violations of the cease-fire negotiated between the government and Maoists in February called into question the level of commitment that each side had towards peace ^[1]. Change in government halfway through the summer resulted in a pause in the peace negotiations, as the new government familiarized itself with the process. The Maoists remained steadfastly committed to a set of three demands: an all-party roundtable to discuss the future of the country, an interim government, and a constitutional assembly. As it became increasingly clear that the King exercised considerable influence in the political scene, the Maoist negotiators demanded his presence or at least active involvement in the negotiations. The King, in an effort to distance himself from the delicate negotiations, remained distant as the summer came to a close. Peace, a desire verbally expressed repeatedly by both sides, remained elusive.

The plodding pace of a negotiation process characterized by exchange of letters and intermittent gun battles, has drawn attention away from those operating on the ground level: the individual Maoist soldier and those affected by the war. Arguably, the most serious threat to peace in Nepal, assuming a successful peace negotiation, is the individual Maoist soldier. Unless the rebels are successfully reintegrated into society and committed to the peace process, the peace will be fleeting. If the victims of Maoist and army violence are not committed to working together for the development of the country, Nepal’s democratic experiment and the development of a truly functioning civil society will be short lived. With popular discourse focused on central themes related to the negotiations, little serious attention has been paid to these “details“ of a post war environment.

Assuming an eventual negotiated peace, a host of challenges lie ahead. After seven years of fighting and more than 7,000 dead, how likely are Maoist soldiers to become a constructive part of society? What are motivations and desires of those individuals involved in the Maoist movement? How likely are these rebels to follow the orders of leaders who they may think have betrayed what they fought for? And finally, what sort of realistic reintegration and rehabilitation solutions could apply in Nepal? Independent researcher Damian Murphy and human rights activist Prakash Bhattarai, spent the summer of 2003 in Nepal examining these issues and came to some conclusions on what sort of options may exist.

Who are the Maoists and what do they want?

After fighting, some for seven years, how likely are individual Maoists to listen to the leadership in the event of a peace agreement? After having a profound impact on society, this group of young revolutionaries truly is the key to a lasting peace, but also have the potential to be a very destabilizing factor in the country for years to come.

Based on research conducted by several reputable Nepal based organizations, the approximate demographics of the Maoist movement are fairly well known. Most come from rural areas where the prospects for employment are few and citizens have a contentious relationship with the government based on years of abuse during the Panchayat era and the advent of democracy in the early 1990’s. Anywhere between 30-40% of those in the movement are women, some motivated to action by sexual abuse committed against them by government and police authorities, others by the prospect of a better life for them and their children. This is a young movement and there have been reports of soldiers below the age of 18. According to some reports, there are as many as 120,000 Maoists and the movement currently claims to hold power in more than 70 districts.

Their motivations for joining the movement are also well documented. In informal conversations with former and current Maoists in Kathmandu, Dhading and Bara, our research team found many motivations that have been echoed throughout the country: discrimination against those from lower castes, and unequal distribution of economic, social and political resources. Interestingly absent were any mention of issues central to the Maoist leadership, such as a new constitutional assembly. For these young Maoists, their motivations to fight are driven by local issues and local concerns in their villages, prompting one to ask whether they would have supported non-violent democratically oriented political parties, had they been able to deliver on their promises of local development.

As evidenced by their list of demands, the Maoists have voiced a commitment to the democratic process as a means towards achieving their goals. As compared with other “Maoist” movements around the world, the Maoists of Nepal appear to have a novel approach to the peace process. As one former Maoist Commander put it, “The Maoists of Nepal are not like other Maoists from around the world. They are flexible. One of their top demands is that they want a new constitution! These are not unreasonable things given the situation in the country.”^[2] This flexibility is further evidenced by the fact that the Maoists do not call for a purely communist state, but a constitutional assembly. This sentiment has seemed to filter down to the rank and file though with conditions. In one conversation, a Maoist soldier commented that, “We are ready to settle in a multi-party democracy, but the government needs to be willing to discuss our political agendas as well as sincere in bringing about changes in the standard of living for people.”

Will the soldier follow?

Upon the signing of a peace agreement, the Maoists we spoke with seem willing to abide to what the leadership negotiates provided they do not, “forget those who spilled their blood for the movement to bring change.” Some seemed to fear the future if the peace talks failed, one predicting a “great massacre” if an agreement is not followed.

No matter what the outcome of the reintegration process, there will remain those who wish for a pure Maoist state or simple criminals who stand to profit from continued conflict. The key will lie in minimizing the threat of these forces such that they do not gain the public support and the peace process can continue.

Reintegration needs

One Maoist said, “the peace process needs to be agreed to on the policy level, but the peace process needs to be initiated at the local level.” There appears to be recognition on the part of the Maoists that the reintegration process could be very difficult if not handled correctly. When asked what Maoists want in terms of reintegration assistance, the answers focused not on themselves but on the concerns of the citizens that the Maoists were “fighting for.”

Some of those interviewed seemed perplexed by the administrative hassles that came with provision of local government services such as getting a passport or other identification documents. When asked what could help them reintegrate back into society, many mentioned a desire for more equal treatment from local government officials and smoother administrative practices. Many were proponents for true decentralization of power to the local areas.

Economic reintegration: Jobs, Training and Education programs

When asked, most Maoists would put the economic concerns of the community before their own, but when pressed they voiced their personal desires for economic reintegration. Some voiced a need for “provision of employment” and “alternative ways of survival”. This is critical to the reintegration process. It follows that young rebels will be less likely to return to the battlefield if suitable employment programs are enacted. After 50 years of development in Nepal, what can be done to economically reintegrate soldiers that have not already been tried?

Throughout Africa, several economic reintegration strategies have been implemented for soldiers from rebel movements. From the outset, it is critical to initiate substantial research on the economic realities of the area in question such that real economic concerns are being met and an artificial economy is not being developed. From research on actual needs, job-training programs can be developed. Economic reintegration for the Maoists needs to be part of a coordinated overall approach -- a central concern of some Maoists we talked to was that that the economic needs of the common villager be addressed. Without a comprehensive approach to the social and economic ills of the whole village, successful reintegration of the Maoists is not possible.

In Mozambique, several measures were taken to ensure the reintegration of young soldiers following that country‘s years long conflict. First, soldiers were given a 18 month subsidy to assist their reintegration back into communities. This subsidy also addressed the short-term concern that these soldiers would be perceived as drains on the local economy. Second, the soldiers were entered into jobs training programs that were reflective of the economic needs of the communities. Third, the soldiers were given agriculture kits that usually consisted of farming tools, seed, fertilizer and veterinary drugs. This would encourage them to return to farming in rural areas where there were employment opportunities for unskilled soldiers. Training in areas such as driving, mechanics, welding, carpentry, farming, and husbandry were also offered for ex-soldiers.

If implemented, skills training programs should be strictly demand driven and not dictated by what Nepali government or international community assumes should be implemented. If properly implemented, training programs could also be socially beneficial in providing the ex-combatant with a skill that is valuable to the community as a whole.

Social integration: Forgiveness and the Importance of Ritual

One Maoist soldier voiced his desire that their “weaknesses committed during the movement should be excused“ and that they “should be recognized for having fought for the nation.” This is a critical piece of the reintegration process that can be found in other countries throughout the world. In Mozambique, local communities performed healing rituals in local communities to promote the reintegration process. ^[3] These rituals, sometimes religious in nature, helped to bind the community as inhabitants and others committed to looking towards the future together. Some argued that this form of reintegration was more effective in preventing violence in the long term than the funds provided by the international community for expensive economic reintegration programs.

In some cases, where ex-combatants have been relocated to a new community other effective forms of social integration have occurred. Matts Berdahl, a renowned expert on reintegration commented that in Mozambique, “arguably marriage by ex-soldiers with local women has played a more significant and enduring role in facilitating (re)integration into an alien community. In these instances, entering into the ‘traditional’ institution has placed the former combatant squarely within the social web of obligations that constituted kinship ties within local communities.” ^[4]

In Nepal, there exist many cultural rituals throughout the year related to religion, the harvest and Nepali culture. For example, Dwarikit is common ritual in many villages where young men and women compete in song and dance. Throughout rural Nepal, villagers celebrate the end of harvest with rituals. In many villages when a Gerka soldier prepares to leave the country, a departure ritual is conducted and upon his return a purification ritual takes place to cleanse him for actions in battle. In some Nepali communities, it may be difficult to implement such programs as Maoists in many areas have virulently fought against the conduct of rituals, especially those religious in nature.

If both sides are willing and committed to reintegration, these cultural events can serve as significant and tangible means towards binding a social fabric critically frayed by years of war.

In some villages in western Nepal, physical reintegration is not necessary because many of the Maoist soldiers are not in the jungle, but already in villages and living among civilians. In interviews conducted, villagers commented that the government security forces were present in the area while hours a day, while the Maoists were in control for the remaining 23. Unfortunately, this trend means that the battlefield is in the village, resulting in many deaths attributed to crossfire. Many cases have been reported where Maoist soldiers govern the village and direct development projects. Their power comes from their ability to get results in building the infrastructure of development, but more than that from the threat of violent force. Remove the gun as a means of authority and Maoists may find it difficult governs.

International aid organizations can also play a role in the social reintegration process in proposing various strategies that have worked elsewhere. For example, conflict resolution specialists may be helpful in some communities affected by particularly egregious violence. In addition, comprehensive education campaigns on the peace process are often necessary due to the lack of reliable information at the local level. In addition, education for reintegrated forces on their civil rights and responsibilities is often useful.

Military Integration

Some observers have proposed integrating Maoist soldiers into the Royal Nepal Army. While this may be an enticing career option for a Maoist soldier with few options for gainful employment at home, many challenges are posed by such an approach.

First, the individual Maoist would likely face a difficult time in serving alongside an RNA soldier who he fought against only a short time before. Complicated logistical questions related to command structures, barracks quartering, and duties assigned are sure to confound negotiators on both sides.

Second, at the time of this writing, the Royal Nepali Army did not accept women soldiers. While the government has recently indicated their openness to women inclusion in the armed forces ^[5] , it is thus far only in an administrative support capacity. With the Maoist movement rumored at anywhere between 30 and 40 percent women, this could pose a significant challenge. It is difficult to imagine a Nepali soldier accepting the female command, never mind command from a woman Maoist soldier. After attaining an elevated status within the Maoist movement as a Commander or higher, a Maoist woman soldier may be loathe to join the RNA at an administrative level as a secretary.

While there are significant inherent challenges to integrating the military, the fact remains that some degree of integration is necessary in order to help preclude the development of paramilitary groups around the country.

Conclusion

The reintegration of Maoists into society may seem untenable in the short-term as the conflict continues to take lives in Nepal. When a negotiated settlement is reached, both sides need to pay particular attention to the issues outlined above. Without careful thought, a poorly planned reintegration effort could easily unravel any peace agreement no matter how well intentioned. Comprehensive social, economic and military reintegration that involves the local community could provide a critical opportunity for sustained development to occur at the local level.

Selected Sources for Background Information:

“Sustaining the Peace in Angola: An Overview of Current Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration.” By João Gomes Porto and Imogen Parsons
Published by: Bonn International Center for Conversion

The Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique, by Chris Alden
The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance
Document Posted: 29 January 2003

^[1]At the time of writing, forty six people have been killed in Maoist related violence since the cease fire took hold according to INSEC. (Nepali Times 8-14, August 2003).
^[2]Interview with a former Maoist Commander, July 18, 2003
^[3]The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Title: The Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique, Chris Alden
^[4]The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Title: The Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique, Chris Alden
^[5]Interview with Nepali NGO leader, August 21, 2003

Human Rights | Nepal | Reports